#34(L) 7/13/64

Memorandum 64-49

Subject: Study No. 34(L) - Uniform Rules of Evidence (Evidence Code - Division 10 - Hearsay Evidence)

Attached to this memorandum as Exhibit I is a letter from the Lassen County Bar Association. The section numbers used in the original letter have been revised to conform to the current numbering system.

You will also receive with this memorandum a revised Division 10 of the Evidence Code, relating to hearsay evidence. The comments to the sections appear separately and also are attached; they should be read together with the sections to which they relate. The following matters should be especially noted:

Organization of the division

At the beginning of the division, there is a divisional outline showing all of the sections in the division. You will note that Chapter 2 has been organized into articles pursuant to your directives at the June meeting. In organizing the chapter into articles, we moved some of the sections around in order to achieve a more logical organization of the chapter. The article on Confessions and Admissions and Declarations Against Interest are now at the beginning of the division instead of Prior Statements of Witnesses; and Former Testimony, which was second, has been placed between Official Reports and Judgments.

Organizational problems relating to the various sections relating to writings will be presented in the memorandum relating to Division 11.

Drafting of hearsay rule and exceptions; Section 1200

(1) Section 1200 formerly stated that "Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as provided in Chapter 2 . . . ." Chapter 2 contained a section providing an exception for any hearsay evidence declared to be admissible by statute. The section formerly appearing in Chapter 2 has been deleted, and instead Section 1200 is now introduced by "Except as provided by statute . . . ."

(2) Should hearsay exceptions be limited to those created by statute? The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee has revised their equivalent of this section to read:

> Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible except as permitted by rule of law established by statute or decision or by exceptions provided in Rules 63(1) through 63(32). [Emphasis supplied.]

(3) Section 155 defines "hearsay evidence" as "evidence of a statement . . . ." Section 1200 provides that hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as provided by statute. Accordingly, to be accurate, our exceptions should be worded:

> Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule . . . .

Many of them formerly read:

> A statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule.

We have revised the sections in Chapter 2 to read, "Evidence of a statement . . ." as suggested above.

(4) The meaning of the hearsay rule depends largely on the definition of "statement" in Section 225:

> "Statement" means not only an oral or written expression but also nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for words in expressing the matter stated.

Although the definition is technically accurate, the form of expression, "not

only . . . but also . . .", does not seem to be clearly limiting. In other words, the section does not clearly state that nonverbal conduct that is not intended as a communication cannot amount to a "statement." We suggest that the meaning would be clearer if the section were revised to read:

> "Statement" means (a) an oral or written verbal expression or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for words in expressing the matter stated.

Section 1201

The Lassen County Bar apparently thinks the section is necessary but should be rejected. See Exhibit I. See the Comment to the section for a typical example of an application of the section.

Section 1202

The Lassen County Bar also criticized this section. See the Comment for the underlying rationale.

Section 1203

This section is new. It was added pursuant to the direction of the Commission at the last meeting. The Commission asked the staff to prepare a draft that would be applicable to all hearsay exceptions except those, such as admissions, where considerations of policy indicate that the principle of the section should not apply.

The exclusions are in subdivisions (b) and (c). Parties are excluded because a party should not have the right to cross-examine himself. Agents, partners, or employees of a party are excluded in order to restrict the right of a party to cross-examine his own representatives. The persons mentioned in (3) are excluded because they are, in effect, parties. The persons excluded in (1), (2), and (3) are comparable to those mentioned in C.C.P. § 2016(d)(2)

as persons whose depositions may be used for any purpose by the adverse party. Witnesses are excluded under (4) because the right of cross-examination of witnesses should be determined by which party called the witness. A party should not have the right to cross-examine his own witness merely because, for example, the adverse party impeaches him with an inconsistent statement.

The exclusions in (c) may not be necessary in the light of (b). However, the reference to the articles does pick up some items of hearsay that would not be picked up by (b). See the divisional outline. Exclusion of the additional items--such as judgments--seems desirable. Are there any other forms of hearsay listed in the divisional outline that should be included?

Section 1204

Section 1204 is new. It has been added pursuant to the decision of the Commission at the June meeting.

Section 1205

The Commission approved URE Rule 64 in principle at the last meeting. However, all of the Commissioners who approved the rule were not present when the specific matters to be included were considered. As there was neither enough votes to fill in the substance of the rule nor enough to disapprove the rule, the matter was deferred for later consideration when a more adequate quorum would permit disposition one way or the other.

To summarize briefly, the Commission originally decided to reject Rule 64 on the ground that discovery was sufficient. It was pointed out in the comments received that discovery in criminal cases does not supply the deficiency. In Memorandum 64-31 (distributed last month) we discussed the scope of the

prosecution's right of discovery in criminal cases. To summarize the discussion there, it seems possible that under Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56 (1962) and People v. Lopez, 60 A.C. 171 (1963) the defendant can be ordered to furnish the prosecution with the names and addresses of the witnesses he will call and also any written statements or notes of statements by such witnesses.

To decide what subdivisions should be included in Section 1205, please refer to the divisional outline where all of the hearsay exceptions are listed.

New Jersey's revised version of Rule 64 now includes:

(3) - Evid. C. §§ 1291, 1292
(15) - Evid. C. § 1280
(16) - Evid. C. § 1281
(17) - Evid. C. §§ 1284, 1510
(18) - Evid. C. § 1316
(19) - Evid. C. § 1600
(21) - Evid. C. § 1301
(29) - Evid. C. § 1330

The policy underlying Rule 64--to give the adverse party adequate opportunity to check the accuracy of the original hearsay and an opportunity, if desired, to cross-examine the declarant under Section 1203--suggests that the following matters might be included:

All official writings, whether specified in Chapter 2 or not.

Articles 7 (business records), 8 (official reports), 9 (former testimony), and 13 (dispositive instruments and ancient writings).

Sections 1315 (church records), 1316 (marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates).

So far as the form of the section is concerned, New Jersey's last version is as follows:

> Whenever a statement admissible by reason of paragraphs . . . is in the form of a writing, the judge may exclude it at the trial if it appears that the proponent's intention to offer the writing in evidence was not made known to the adverse party at such a time as to provide him with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.

Section 1206

The Lassen County Bar again suggests that all hearsay exceptions be brought within the Evidence Code.

Section 1223

The language of Section 1223 has not been presented to you before. It has been revised, however, in accordance with the Commission's instructions given at the last meeting.

Section 1226

Suppose the following case: A suffers damage for which B is liable. P compensates A pursuant to some legal obligation to do so and becomes subrogated to A's right against B. B disappears, so that A's right can be asserted only against D surety company who has agreed to compensate those injured by B. In the action of P against D, P can introduce an admission by B under Section 1226. But it seems unlikely that D can introduce an admission by A unless it also qualifies as a declaration against interest.

As a matter of policy, shouldn't the position of the respective representatives be the same? We suggest that Section 1226 be amended to refer to a "right" as well as to a "liability, obligation, or duty" of the declarant.

A similar problem exists in wrongful death cases. Under existing California law, an admission by a decedent is not admissible against his heirs or representatives in a wrongful death action brought by them. Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 460 (1901); Carr v. Duncan, 90 Cal. App.2d 282, 202 P.2d 855 (1949); Marks v. Reissinger, 35 Cal. App. 44, 169 Pac. 243 (1917). The reason is that the action is a new action, not merely a survival of the decedent's action.

Hence, the decedent is not in "privity" with the plaintiff.

This rule is severely criticized in Carr v. Duncan, supra, 90 Cal. App.2d at 285, where it is pointed cut that the California rule is distinctly in the minority:

> It would seem that since contributory negligence of a decedent may defeat the action of his heirs or representatives, evidence of his declarations or admissions pertinent to the issue of contributory negligence should be admitted . . . just as evidence of the defending party's declarations are admitted against him on the issue of negligence.

Should a provision be added to make the admissions of the plaintiff's decedent admissible against the plaintiff? If so, the following is suggested:

> 1227. Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the heirs or personal representatives of the declarant in an action for the wrongful death of the declarant.

Section 1230

This section has been substantially revised in the interest of simplicity. Changes from the last approved version are shown below in strikeout and underline:

> [~~(a)--As used in this section "declaration against interest" means~~] Evidence of a statement [~~that~~] by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tendered to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
>
> [~~(b)--A declaration against interest is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if:~~
>
> ~~(1)--The declarant is not a party to the action in which the statement is offered; and~~
>
> ~~(2)--The declarant had sufficient knowledge of the subject.~~]

You will note that the revised version has no counterpart for former subdivision (b)(1). The requirement that the declarant be a non-party was originally placed in the rule to avoid the necessity for making the section inapplicable to the defendant in a criminal case. The original URE rule made the section inapplicable to the criminal defendant. With Section 1204 in the Evidence Code--requiring all hearsay statements offered aginst criminal defendants to be admissible against the declarant under the confessions rule--the need to distinguish between criminal defendants and others, nonparties and parties, etc., has disappeared. Since the classification of the statement of a party as an admission or a declaration against interest is solely of academic interest in the light of the changes made by the Commission in the Evidence Code, we do not believe there is any need to continue former subdivision (b)(1).

Sections 1235 and 1236

These sections were previously in one section. We have split them for the sake of simplicity. We have also simplified the language of the opening paragraph. The opening paragraph formerly read:

> A statement made by a person who is a witness at the hearing, but not made at the hearing, is not made inadmissible if made by him while testifying and the statement is:

The detailed conditions for the admissibility of a prior consistent statement have been removed from Section 1236 and a cross-reference to Section 788 substituted. The admissibility of such statements depends on conditions more germane to credibility than to hearsay. Hence, we believe the conditions of admissibility should be stated in the section dealing specifically with the admissibility of such evidence on the issue of credibility.

Section 1237

The Lassen County Bar opposes that portion of the recorded memory section that permits evidence of memory recorded by another to be admitted.

The New Jersey Committee has approved our version of this section in lieu of the URE rule that it originally recommended. There are some modifications of our provision in the New Jersey version that deserve some consideration. They are:

> Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement would have been admissible if made by him while testifying [~~at the hearing~~] and the statement concerns a matter as to which the witness has [~~no~~] insufficient present recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately and [~~is~~] contained in a writing which:
>
> [Subdivisions (a) and (b) are identical with Section 1237.] and
>
> (c) Is offered after the witness has testified that the statement he made was a true statement of such fact, provided that where the witness remembers only a part of the contents of a writing, the part he does not remember may be read to the jury but shall not be introduced as a written exhibit over objection. [~~; and~~
>
> ~~(d) Is offered after the writing is authenticated as an accurate record of the statement.~~]

Section 1240

The New Jersey counterpart of subdivision (b) now reads:

> Was made while the declarant was under the stress of a nervous excitement caused by such perception, in reasonable proximity to the event, and without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.

Section 1242

The Lassen County Bar approved the section; but the New Jersey committee restricted it to criminal cases.

Sections 1250-1252

Apparently, the words "state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation

(including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health)" in Section 1250 include "symptoms, pain, or physical sensation" within the meaning of Section 1252. This conclusion is reached because the equivalent of Section 1252 was included in the URE only because Section 1250 excludes evidence of a statement narrating a memory of a past mental or physical state. Hence, Section 1252 was necessary to permit evidence of statements of previous symptoms to be given. Evidence of existing symptoms was covered by the general language.

If the words used in Section 1250 include symptoms, the words used in Section 1251 also include symptoms, for the same words are used. Hence, there are two sections permitting statements of previous symptoms to be admitted--Sections 1251 and 1252. There are some differences in the conditions of admissibility stated in the two sections. Under Section 1251, the declarant must be unavailable, and the evidence is admissible to prove only the prior mental or physical state--the prior mental or physical state cannot be used as a basis for inferring some other fact. Under Section 1252, the statement must be made to a physician for the purpose of treatment; but the declarant need not be unavailable, and the previous symptoms, pain, etc. may be used as circumstantial evidence so long as it is relevant to an issue of the declarant's bodily condition.

The foregoing is pointed out only to make sure that the Commission intends the differences. If Section 1252 is to be the only section relating to previous symptoms, Section 1251 should be modified by deleting "physical sensation", "pain", and "bodily health".

The New Jersey counterpart of this article contains an exception for a statement if it

described to a physician consulted for purposes of treatment the inception, general character of the cause or external source of symptoms, pain, or physical sensation where such description was pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.

Section 1261

The Lassen County Bar reports that it has grave doubts concerning the section.

Section 1271

The opening paragraph and first subdivision of the section have been modified somewhat. The former language was:

> A writing offered as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if:
>
> * * * * *
>
> (b) It was made in the regular course of a business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; . . . .

We think it is more accurate to say, insofar as the hearsay rule is concerned, that the hearsay rule does not exclude evidence of a writing made as a business record of an act, condition, or event when such evidence is offered to prove the act, condition, or event. Accordingly, the section has been revised to read as it appears in the Evidence Code draft. Usually, of course, the "evidence of a writing" must be the writing itself. Section 1500 (the best evidence rule). But secondary evidence of the writing may be used in exceptional situations.

Section 1272

Note that in Section 1271 the judge is required to find that the "sources of information and method and time of preparation" of a business record offered to prove the truth of its content "were such as to indicate its trustworthiness "

This seems to indicate that the judge must be convinced of the reliability of the business records involved. On the other hand, Section 1272 merely requires that he determine that the "sources of information and method and time of preparation . . . are such as to indicate that the absence of a record . . . warrants an inference" of the nonoccurrence of the event. This seems to indicate that the judge must admit the evidence either upon evidence sufficient to sustain a finding or, at most, upon evidence barely tipping the scales of probability.

Should the standards be the same? If so, Section 1272 should be revised to indicate that the absence of a record "is trustworthy evidence" of the nonoccurrence of the event.

The differing standards stem to a certain extent from the fact that Section 1271 clearly involves hearsay, while Section 1272 technically involves circumstantial evidence--not hearsay. However, the problems are similar. Under Section 1271, it is the employee who observed and reported the event who cannot be cross-examined--hence, the high standard of reliability. Under Section 1272, we are relying on that same employee's failure to report. Cross-examination of the employee seems just as needful as if the employee had expressly stated that the unreported event did not occur. Since, in either case, we are relying on the perceptions of persons not before the court, there seems to be good reason for imposing the same standards of admissibility on both kinds of evidence.

Section 1280

The New Jersey Committee added the following to the official reports exception:

> A statement . . . [is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule] if in the form of . . . statistical findings made by such a public official

[of the United States or of a state or territory of the United States] whose duty it was to investigate the facts concerning the act, condition, or event and to make statistical findings.

Copy of official writing

In the last draft of the hearsay division, a section followed what is now Section 1281 that read:

> A writing that is a copy of a writing in the custody of a public employee is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the content of the writing in the custody of the public employee.

The section has been deleted as unnecessary. The problem to which it relates is covered by Section 1510. Moreover, the section did not state a hearsay exception. A copy is not hearsay evidence of the original if there is direct testimony that it is a copy of the original. The hearsay problem, if any, relates only to certified copies, and even then the hearsay evidence is the certification, not the copy.

Section 1290

At the last meeting the Commission decided to include testimony given in an arbitration proceeding within the definition of "former testimony" if the testimony was reported by an official reporter. Subdivision (d) is designed to carry out that decision. An official reporter is one who has been appointed to act as such by the courts. Gov. C. § 69941. A certified shorthand reporter is one who has been found qualified to serve as an official reporter. Gov. C. § 69942.

Section 1311

The New Jersey equivalent of subdivision (a)(2) reads:

> The declarant was otherwise so intimately associated with the other's

family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared.

The foregoing is the same as our subdivision, except that our subdivision goes on to say:

> and made the statement (i) upon information received from the other or from a person related by blood or marriage to the other or (ii) upon repute in the other's family.

We suggest that this additional language in our version of the exception could be deleted without harm to the rule.

Section 1314

Section 1314 is new. We broke up the section in the last draft relating to community reputation. Most of the section appears in Article 12, but inasmuch as this portion of the section relates to family history, we moved it into this article.

Section 1315

At the May meeting, the Commission instructed the staff to add a provision to the Evidence Code making an exception to the hearsay rule for recitals of family history contained in church records that are otherwise admissible as business records. Section 1315 is the section designed to carry out that decision. The phrase "church, religious denomination, or society" is taken from the existing statute on church records. C.C.P. § 1919a.

Section 1316

The Commission, at the May meeting, also instructed the staff to broaden the provision in the RURE relating to marriage certificates so that it would apply to baptismal, confirmation, and similar certificates. Section 1316 is the section designed to carry out that decision.

Section 1340

The Lassen County Bar suggests the addition of a foundational showing "as to how widely [such publications] are accepted, or by whom published, or some fact insuring their reliability."

Section 1341

The New Jersey version of this rule now reads:

> An expert witness may refer to and read excerpts from learned treatises in support of his testimony provided notice is given before trial when reference thereto in the direct testimony is contemplated.

Added exception

The New Jersey Committee has added the following exception:

> In a civil proceeding, a statement made by a person unavailable as a witness because of his death is admissible if the statement was made in good faith, upon the personal knowledge of the declarant, and there is circumstantial probability that the statement is trustworthy.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph B. Harvey
Assistant Executive Secretary

Memo 64-49 EXHIBIT I

PAULA A. TENNANT
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Susanville, California

March 31, 1964

Mr. John H. DeMoully
Executive Secretary
California Law Revision Commission
Room 30, Crothers Hall
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Stanford, California 94305

Re: Tentative draft of Proposed Statute
Sections Relating to Hearsay Evidence

Dear Mr. DeMoully:

The local Bar generally felt that Section 240 on the unavailability of a witness was a clarification and assistance and hence approved it.

Section 1201, while it was generally received as necessary, was rejected on the ground that this was treading on an amorphous area in which a great amount of difficulty and argument could ensue.

Section 1202 was criticized on the ground that from the defense point of view a witness should be given an opportunity to explain his inconsistent statement or other conduct. My personal view and that of two other lawyers was that it tended generally to bring out the truth and should be accepted.

Under Section 1206, as I have repeatedly said, the local Bar feels that the retention of certain admissions of hearsay evidence in the particular codes is going to result in a great amount of difficulty and request that it be included in the new code of evidence as well as being cross indexed to the particular code applicable.

Opposed that portion of Section 1237 which allows the use of a record made by a person other than the witness or under his direction. Section 1292 received doubtful approval but there was the general consensus that it would allow the admission of necessary and helpful evidence.

Approved 1242.

Approved 1230.

Approved 1260.

Had grave doubts as to 1261.

Approved 1310.

Approved 1314, 1320, 1321, 1322.

Approved 1330.

Approved 1340 with the additional requirement that there be some showing as to how widely they are accepted, or by whom published, or some fact insuring their reliability.

Sections not commented on in this letter received no comment upon discussion. I am sure that you will be well aware of the fact that the comments and reports concerning the various sections which have been here made were the result of a rather sketchy presentation since to have explained in detail the various sections would have taken an unwarranted length of time and some of the objections and approvals I am sure are the result of first blush impressions, some were the expression of merely the more vocal members of the Bar and some were the result of the decision in a particular case which had just affected the speaker.

I hope that this will be of some assistance to you although I feel in my own mind that it is far from an adequate or comprehensive reaction of the practicing members of the local Bar.

Yours very truly,

(Mrs.) Paula A. Tennant
President
Lassen County Bar Association

PAT/dc

DIVISION 10. HEARSAY EVIDENCE

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

§1200. The hearsay rule.

Comment. Section 1200 states the hearsay rule. That hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless the evidence is within an exception to that rule has been the law of California since the earliest days of the state. See, e.g., People v. Bob, 29 Cal.2d 321, 175 P.2d 12 (1946); Kilburn v. Ritchie, 2 Cal. 145 (1852). Nevertheless, Section 1200 is the first statutory statement of the rule. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1845 (superseded by Evidence Code § 702) permits a witness to testify concerning those facts only that are personally known to him "except in those few express cases in which . . . the declarations of others, are admissible"; and that section has been considered to be the statutory basis for the hearsay rule. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d ___, ___, 389 P.2d 377, 380, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 844 (1964). It has been recognized, however, as an insufficient basis for the hearsay rule. The section merely states the requirement of personal knowledge, and a witness testifying to the hearsay statement of another must have personal knowledge of that statement just as he must have personal knowledge of any other matter concerning which he testifies. Sneed v. Marysville Gas etc. Co., 149 Cal. 704, 708, 87 Pac. 376, 378 (1906).

Under Section 1200, exceptions to the hearsay rule must be created by statute. This will change the California law; for inasmuch as the rule excluding hearsay was not statutory, the courts have not been bound by the statutes in recognizing exceptions to the rule. See, People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d ___, ___, 389 P.2d 377, 380, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 844 (1964).

"Hearsay evidence" is defined in Section 155 as "evidence of a statement made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." Under existing case law, too, the hearsay rule applies only to out-of-court statements that are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If the statement is offered for some purpose other than to prove the fact stated therein, the evidence is not objectionable under the hearsay rule. Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 611, 621, 150 P.2d 892, (1944); Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 30 Pac. 529 (1892). See WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 215-218 (1958).

The word "statement" that is used in the definition of "hearsay evidence" is defined in Section 225 as "oral or written expression" or "nonverbal conduct . . . intended . . . as a substitute for words in expressing the matter stated." Hence, evidence of a person's out-of-court conduct is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule expressed in Section 1200 unless that conduct is clearly assertive in character. Nonassertive conduct is not hearsay.

Some California cases have regarded evidence of nonassertive conduct as hearsay evidence if it is offered to prove the actor's belief in a particular fact as a basis for an inference that the fact believed is true. See, e.g., Estate of De Laveaga, 165 Cal. 607, 624, 133 Pac. 307, (1913)("the manner in which a person whose sanity is in question was treated by his family is not, taken alone, competent substantive evidence tending to prove insanity, for it is a mere extra-judicial expression of opinion on the part of the family"); People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 52, 223 Pac. 65, (1924) ("Circumstances of flight [of other persons from the scene of a crime] are in the nature of confessions . . . and are, therefore, in the nature of hearsay evidence").

Other California cases, however, have admitted evidence of nonassertive conduct as evidence that the belief giving rise to the conduct was based on fact. See, e.g., People v. Reifenstuhl, 37 Cal. App.2d 402, 99 P.2d 564 (1940)(hearing denied)(incoming telephone calls made for the purpose of placing bets admissible over hearsay objection to prove that place of reception was bookmaking establishment).

Under the Evidence Code, nonassertive conduct is not regarded as hearsay for two reasons: First, such conduct, being nonassertive, does not involve the veracity of the declarant; hence, one of the principal reasons for the hearsay rule--to exclude declarations where the veracity of the declarant cannot be tested by cross-examination--does not apply. Second, there is frequently a guarantee of the trustworthiness of the inference to be drawn from such nonassertive conduct because the actor has based his actions on the correctness of his belief. To put the matter another way, in such cases actions speak louder than words.

Of course, if the probative value of evidence of nonassertive conduct is outweighed by the likelihood that such evidence will confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or consume too much time, the judge may exclude the evidence under Section 352.

§ 1201. Multiple hearsay.

Comment. Section 1201 makes it possible to use admissible hearsay to prove another statement was made that is also admissible hearsay. For example, under Section 1201, an official reporter's transcript of the testimony at another trial may be used to prove the nature of the testimony previously given (Section 1280), the former testimony may be used

as hearsay evidence (under Section 1291) to prove that a party made an admission. The admission is admissible (Section 1221) to prove the truth of the matter stated. Thus, under Section 1201, the evidence of the admission contained in the transcript is admissible because each of the hearsay statements involved is within an exception to the hearsay rule.

Although no California case has been found where the admissibility of "multiple hearsay" has been analyzed and discussed, the practice is apparently in accord with the rule stated in Section 1201 See, e.g., People v. Collup, 27 Cal.2d 829, 167 P.2d 714 (1946)(transcript of former testimony used to prove admission).

§ 1202. Credibility of hearsay declarant.

Comment. Section 1202 deals with the impeachment of one whose hearsay statement is in evidence as distinguished from the impeachment of a witness who has testified. It has two purposes. First, it makes clear that such evidence is not to be excluded on the ground that it is collateral. Second, it makes clear that the rule applying to impeachment of a witness--that a witness may be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement only if he is provided with an opportunity to explain it--does not apply to a hearsay declarant.

The California courts have permitted a party to impeach hearsay evidence given under the former testimony exception with evidence of an inconsistent statement by the hearsay declarant, even though the declarant had no opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency, when the inconsistent statement was made after the former testimony was given. People v. Collup, 27 Cal.2d 829, 167 P.2d 714 (1946). The courts have also permitted dying

declarations to be impeached by evidence of contradictory statements by the deceased, although no foundation was laid. People v. Lawrence, 21 Cal. 368 (1863). Apparently, however, former testimony may not be impeached by evidence of an inconsistent statement made prior to the former testimony unless the would-be impeacher either did not know of the inconsistent statement at the time the former testimony was given or provided the declarant with an opportunity to deny or explain the inconsistent statement. People v. Greenwell, 20 Cal. App.2d 266, 66 P.2d 674 (1937) as limited by People v. Collup, 27 Cal.2d 829, 167 P.2d 714 (1946).

Section 1202 substitutes for this case law a uniform rule permitting a hearsay declarant to be impeached by inconsistent statements in all cases, whether or not the declarant has been given an opportunity to deny or explain the inconsistency. If the hearsay declarant is unavailable as a witness, the party against whom the evidence is admitted should not be deprived of both his right to cross-examine and his right to impeach. Cf., People v. Lawrence, 21 Cal. 368, 372 (1863). If the hearsay declarant is available, the party electing to use the hearsay of such a declarant should have the burden of calling him to explain or deny any alleged inconsistencies.

Of course, the trial judge may curb efforts to impeach hearsay declarants if he determines that the inquiry is straying into remote and collateral matters. Section 352.

Section 1202 provides that inconsistent statements of a hearsay declarant may not be used to prove the truth of the matters stated. In contrast, Section 1235 provides that evidence of prior inconsistent statements made by a trial witness may be admitted to prove the truth of the matters stated. Unless the declarant is a witness and subject to cross-examination upon the

subject matter of his statements, there is not a sufficient guarantee of the trustworthiness of his out-of-court statements to warrant their reception as substantive evidence unless they fall within some recognized exception to the hearsay rule.

§ 1203. Cross-examination of hearsay declarant.

Comment. Hearsay evidence is generally excluded from evidence because of the lack of opportunity for the adverse party to cross-examine the hearsay declarant before the trier of fact. People v. Bob, 29 Cal.2d 321, 325, 175 P.2d 12, (1946). In some situations, hearsay evidence is admitted because of some exceptional need for the evidence and because there is some circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness that justifies a violation of a party's right of cross-examination. People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 785, 306 P.2d 480, (1957); Turney v. Sousa, 146 Cal. App.2d 787, 791, 304 P.2d 1025, (1956).

Even though it is necessary or desirable to permit some hearsay evidence to be received without guaranteeing the adverse party the right to cross-examine the declarant, there seems to be no reason to prohibit the adverse party from cross-examining the declarant altogether. The policy in favor of cross-examination that underlies the hearsay rule, therefore, indicates that the adverse party should be accorded the right to call the declarant of a statement that has been received and to cross-examine him concerning the subject matter of his statement.

Hence, Section 1203 has been included in the Evidence Code to reverse, insofar as a hearsay declarant is concerned, the traditional rule that a witness called by a party is a witness for that party and may not be cross-examined by him. As a hearsay declarant is in practical effect a witness

against that party, Section 1203 gives the party against whom a hearsay statement is admitted the right to call and cross-examine the hearsay declarant concerning the subject matter of the hearsay statement just as he has the right to cross-examine the witnesses who appear personally and testify against him at the trial.

§ 1204. Hearsay statement offered against criminal defendant.

Comment. In People v. Underwood, 61 Cal.2d ___, ___ P.2d ___, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1964), the California Supreme Court held that a prior inconsistent statement of a witness could not be introduced to impeach him in a criminal trial when the prior inconsistent statement would have been inadmissible as an involuntary confession if the witness had been the defendant. Section 1204 applies the principle of the Underwood decision to all hearsay statements.

§ 1205. Pretrial delivery of copy of certain hearsay statements.

Comment. [The form of this rule has not yet been formulated.]

§ 1206. No implied repeal.

Comment. Although some of the statutes providing for the admission of hearsay evidence will be repealed when the Evidence Code is enacted, there will remain in the various codes a number of statutes which, for the most part, are narrowly drawn to make a particular type of hearsay evidence admissible under specifically limited circumstances. It is neither desirable nor feasible to repeal these statutes. Section 1206 makes it clear that these statutes will not be impliedly repealed by the enactment of the Evidence Code.

CHAPTER 2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE

Article 1. Confessions and Admissions

§ 1220. Confession or admission of criminal defendant.

Comment. Section 1220 restates the existing law governing the admissibility of the confession or admission of a defendant in a criminal action. People v. Jones, 24 Cal.2d 601, 150 P.2d 801 (1944); People v. Rogers, 22 Cal.2d 787, 141 P.2d 722 (1943); People v. Loper, 159 Cal.6, 112 P. 720 (1910); People v. Speaks, 156 Cal. App.2d 25, 319 P.2d 709 (1957); People v. Haney, 46 Cal. App. 317, 189 Pac. 338 (1920); People v. Lisenba, 14 Cal.2d 403, 94P.2d 569 (1939); People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 346 P.2d 764 (1959). See also Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 475-482 (1963).

Although subdivision (b) is technically unnecessary, for the sake of completeness it is desirable to give express recognition to the fact that any rule of admissibility established by the Legislature is subject to the requirements of the Federal and State Constitutions.

§ 1221. Admission of party to civil action.

Comment. Section 1221 states existing law as found in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870(2). The rationale underlying this exception is that the party cannot object to the lack of the right to cross-examine the declarant, since the party himself made the statement. Moreover, the party can cross-examine the witness who testifies to the party's statement and can deny or explain the purported admission. The statement need not be one which would be admissible if made at the hearing. See Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., 46 Cal. App.2d 477, 116 P.2d 121 (1941).

§ 1222. Adoptive admission.

Comment. Section 1222 restates and supersedes subdivision 3 of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 484 (1963).

§ 1223. Authorized admission.

Comment. Section 1223 provides a hearsay exception for authorized admissions. Under this exception, if a party authorized an agent to make statements on his behalf, such statements may be introduced against the party under the same conditions as if they had been made by the party himself. Section 1223 restates and supersedes the first portion of subdivision 5 of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870. Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 484-490 (1963).

§ 1224. Admission of co-conspirator.

Comment. Section 1224 is a specific example of a kind of authorized admission that is admissible under Section 1223. The statement is admitted because it is an act of the conspiracy for which the party, as a co-conspirator, is legally responsible. People v. Lorraine, 90 Cal. App. 317, 327, 265 Pac. 893, (1928). See CAL. CONT. ED. BAR, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 471-472 (1964). Section 1224 restates and supersedes the provisions of subdivision 6 of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870.

§ 1225. Statement of agent, partner, or employee.

Comment. Section 1223 makes authorized extrajudicial statements admissible. Section 1225 goes beyond this, making admissible against a party

specified extrajudicial statements of an agent, partner or employee, whether or not authorized. A statement is admitted under Section 1225, however, only if it would be admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing whereas no such limitation is applicable to authorized admissions.

The practical scope of Section 1225 is quite limited. The spontaneous statements that it covers are admissible under Section 1240. The self-inculpatory statements which it covers are admissible under Section 1230 as declarations against the declarant's interest. Where the declarant is a witness at the trial, many other statements covered by Section 1225 would be admissible as inconsistent statements under Section 1235. Thus, Section 1225 has independent significance only as to unauthorized, nonspontaneous, noninculpatory statements of agents, partners and employees who do not testify at the trial concerning the matters within the scope of the agency, partnership or employment. For example, the chauffeur's statement following an accident, "It wasn't my fault; the boss lost his head and grabbed the wheel," would be inadmissible as a declaration against interest under Section 1230, it would be inadmissible as an authorized admission under Section 1223, it would be inadmissible under Section 1235 unless the employee testified inconsistently at the trial, it would be inadmissible under Section 1240 unless made spontaneously, but it would be admissible under Section 1225.

Section 1225 goes beyond existing California law as found in subdivision 5 of Section 1870 of the Code of Civil Procedure (superseded by Evidence Code Section 1223). Under existing California law only the statements that the principal has authorized the agent to make are admissible. Peterson Bros. v. Mineral King Fruit Co., 140 Cal. 624, 74 Pac. 162 (1903).

There are two justifications for the limited extension of the exception for agents' statements provided by Section 1225. First, because of the relationship which existed at the time the statement was made, it is unlikely that the statement would have been made unless it were true. Second, the existence of the relationship makes it highly likely that the party will be able to make an adequate investigation of the statement without having to resort to cross-examination of the declarant in open court.

§ 1226. Statement of declarant whose liability is in issue.

Comment. Section 1226 restates in substance a hearsay exception found in Section 1851 of the Code of Civil Procedure (superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1226 and 1302). Cf., Butte County v. Morgan, 76 Cal. 1, 18 Pac. 115 (1888); Ingram v. Bob Jaffee Co., 139 Cal. App.2d 193, 293 P.2d 132 (1956); Standard Oil Co. v. Houser, 101 Cal. App.2d 480, 225 P.2d 539 (1950). Section 1226, however, limits this hearsay exception to civil actions. Much of the evidence within this exception is also covered by Section 1230, which makes admissible declarations against interest. However, to be admissible under Section 1230 the statement must have been against the declarant's interest when made whereas this requirement is not stated in Section 1226.

Section 1302 supplements the rule stated in Section 1226. Section 1302 permits the admission of judgments against a third person when one of the issues between the parties is the liability, obligation, or duty of the third person and the judgment determines that liability, obligation, or duty. Together, Sections 1226 and 1302 codify the holdings of the cases applying Code of Civil Procedure Section 1851. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 491-496 (1963).

Article 2. Declarations Against Interest

§ 1230. Declaration against interest.

Comment. Section 1230 codifies the hearsay exception for declarations against interest as that exception has been developed in the California courts. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d ___, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964). It is not clear, however, whether existing law extends the declaration against interest exception to include statements that make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community.

Section 1230 supersedes the partial and inaccurate statements of the declarations against interest exception found in Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1853, 1870(4), and 1946(1). See People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d at ___, 389 P.2d at 380-381, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 844-845 (1964).

Article 3. Prior Statements of Witnesses

§ 1235. Prior inconsistent statement.

Comment. Under existing law, a prior statement of a witness that is inconsistent with his testimony at the trial is admissible, but because of the hearsay rule such statements may not be used as evidence of the truth of the matters stated. They may be used only to cast discredit on the testimony given at the trial. Albert v. McKay & Co., 174 Cal. 451, 456, (1917).

Section 1235, however, permits a prior inconsistent statement of a witness to be used as substantive evidence if the statement is otherwise

admissible under the rules relating to the impeachment of witnesses. In view of the fact that the declarant is in court and may be examined and cross-examined in regard to his statements and their subject matter, there seems to be little reason to perpetuate the subtle distinction made in the cases. It is not realistic to expect a jury to understand that they cannot believe a witness was telling the truth on a former occasion when they believe the contrary story given at the trial is not true. Moreover, in many cases the prior inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the controversy that gave rise to litigation.

Section 1235 will permit a party to establish a prima facie case by introducing prior inconsistent statements of witnesses. This change in the law, however, will provide a party with desirable protection against the "turncoat" witness who changes his story on the stand and deprives the party calling him of evidence essential to his case.

§ 1236. Prior consistent statement.

Comment. Under existing law, a prior statement of a witness that is consistent with his testimony at the trial is admissible under certain conditions when the credibility of the witness has been attacked. The statement is admitted, however, only to rehabilitate the witness--to support his credibility--and not as evidence of the truth of the matters stated. People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 753-754, (1940).

Section 1236, however, permits a prior consistent statement of a witness to be used as substantive evidence if the statement is otherwise admissible

under the rules relating to the rehabilitation of impeached witnesses. The reasons for this change in the law are much the same as those discussed in the Comment to Section 1235.

§ 1237. Past recollection recorded.

Comment. Section 1237 provides a hearsay exception for what is usually referred to as "past recollection recorded." The section makes no radical departure from existing law, for its provisions are taken largely from the provisions of Section 2047 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are, however, two substantive differences between Section 1237 and existing California law:

First, existing law requires that a foundation be laid for the admission of such evidence by showing (1) that the writing recording the statement was made by the witness or under his direction, (2) that the writing was made at a time when the fact recorded in the writing actually occurred or at such other time when the fact was fresh in the witness' memory and (3) that the witness "knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing." Under Section 1237, however, the writing may be made not only by the witness himself or under his direction but also by some other person for the purpose of recording the witness' statement at the time it was made. In addition, Section 1237 permits testimony of the person who recorded the statement to be used to establish that the writing is a correct record of the statement. Sufficient assurance of the trustworthiness of the statement is provided if the declarant is available to testify that he made a true statement and the person who recorded the statement is available to testify that he accurately recorded the statement.

Second, under Section 1237 the document or other writing embodying the statement is itself admissible in evidence whereas under the present law the declarant reads the writing on the witness stand and the writing is not otherwise made a part of the record unless it is offered in evidence by the adverse party.

Article 4. Spontaneous, Contemporaneous, and Dying Declarations

§ 1240. Spontaneous statement.

Comment. Section 1240 is a codification of the existing exception to the hearsay rule which makes excited statements admissible. Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R., 16 Cal.2d 460, 106 P.2d 895 (1940); Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES 465-466 (1963). The rationale of this exception is that the spontaneity of such statements and the declarant's state of mind at the time when they are made provide an adequate guarantee of their trustworthiness.

§ 1241. Contemporaneous statement.

Comment. Section 1241, which provides a hearsay exception for contemporaneous statements, may go beyond existing law, for no California case in point has been found. Elsewhere the authorities are conflicting in their results and confused in their reasoning owing to the tendency to discuss the problem only in terms of res gestae. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 466-468 (1963).

The statements admissible under subdivision (2) are highly trustworthy because: (1) the statement being simultaneous with the event, there is no memory problem; (2) there is little or no time for calculated misstatement; and (3) the statement is usually made to one who has equal opportunity to observe and check misstatements. In applying this exception, the courts should insist on actual contemporaneousness; otherwise, the trustworthiness of the statements becomes questionable.

§ 1242. Dying declaration.

Comment. Section 1242 is a broadened form of the well-established exception to the hearsay rule which makes dying declarations admissible. The existing law--Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870(4) as interpreted by our courts--makes such declarations admissible only in criminal homicide actions and only when they relate to the immediate cause of the declarant's death. People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 30 Pac. 7 (1892); Thrasher v. Board of Medical Examiners, 44 Cal. App. 26, 185 Pac. 1006 (1919). See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. § STUDIES 472-473 (1963). The rationale of the exception--that men are not apt to lie in the shadow of death--is as applicable to any other declaration that a dying man might make as it is to a statement regarding the immediate cause of his death. Moreover, there is no rational basis for differentiating, for the purpose of the admissibility of dying declarations, between civil and criminal actions, or among various types of criminal actions.

Under Section 1242, the dying declaration is admissible only if it would be admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing. Thus, the dying declaration is admissible only if the declarant would have been a competent witness and made the statement on personal knowledge.

Article 5. Statements of Mental or Physical State

§ 1250. Statement of declarant's then existing physical or mental condition.

Comment. Section 1250 provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of the declarant's then existing physical or mental condition. It

codifies an exception that has been developed by the courts.

Thus, under Section 1250 as under existing law, a statement of the declarant's state of mind at the time of the statement is admissible when that state of mind is itself in issue in the case. Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 Pac. 5 (1920). A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind is also admissible when relevant to show the declarant's state of mind at a time prior to the statement. Watenpaugh v. State Teachers' Retirement, 51 Cal.2d 675, 336 P.2d 165 (1959); Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal.2d 523, 127 P.2d 530 (1942); Estate of Anderson, 185 Cal. 700, 198 Pac. 407 (1921); Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1 (1915). Section 1250 also makes a statement of then existing state of mind admissible to "prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant." Thus, a statement of the declarant's intent to do certain acts is admissible to prove that he did those acts. People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944); Benjamin v. District Grand Lodge, 171 Cal. 260, 152 Pac. 731 (1915). Statements of then existing pain or other bodily condition are also admissible to prove the existence of such condition. Bloomberg v. Laventhal, 179 Cal. 616, 178 Pac. 496 (1919); People v. Wright, 167 Cal. 1, 138 Pac. 349 (1914).

A statement is not admissible under Section 1250 if the statement was made under such circumstances that the declarant in making such statement had motive or reason to deviate from the truth. See Section 1253 and the Comment thereto.

In light of the definition of "hearsay evidence" in Section 155, a distinction should be noted between the use of a declarant's statements of his then existing mental state to prove such mental state and the use of a declarant's statements of other facts as circumstantial evidence of his mental state.

Under the Evidence Code, if the declarant's statements are not being used to prove the truth of their contents but are being used as circumstantial evidence of the declarant's mental state, no hearsay problem is involved. See the Comment to Section 1200.

Section 1250 (b) does not permit a statement of memory or belief to be used to prove the fact remembered or believed. This limitation is necessary to preserve the hearsay rule. Any statement of a past event is, of course, a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind--his memory or belief--concerning the past event. If the evidence of that state of mind--the statement of memory--were admissible to show that the fact remembered or believed actually occurred, any statement narrating a past event would be, by a process of circuitous reasoning, admissible to prove that the event occurred.

The limitation in Section 1250(b) is, in general, in accord with the law developed in the California cases. Thus, in Estate of Anderson, 185 Cal. 700, 198 Pac. 407 (1921), a declaration of a testatrix made after the execution of a will to the effect that the will had been made at an aunt's request was held to be inadmissible hearsay "because it was merely a declaration as to a past event and was not indicative of the condition of mind of the testatrix at the time she made it." 185 Cal. at 720, 198 Pac. at 415 (1921).

A major exception to the principle expressed in Section 1250(b) was created in People v. Merkouris, 52 Cal.2d 672, 344 P.2d 1 (1959). That case held that statements made by the victims of a double homicide relating threats by the defendant were admissible to show the victims' mental state--their fear of the defendant. Their fear was not itself in issue in the case, but the court held that the fear was relevant to show that the defendant had engaged in conduct

engendering the fear, i.e., that the defendant had in fact threatened them. That the defendant had threatened them was, of course, relevant to show that the threats were carried out in the homicide. Thus, in effect, the court permitted the statements to be used to prove the truth of the matters stated in them. In People v. Purvis, 56 Cal.2d 93, 362 P.2d 713, 13 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1961), the doctrine of the Merkouris case was limited to cases where identity is in issue.

Section 1250(b) is contrary to the Merkouris case. The doctrine of that case is repudiated because it is an attack on the hearsay rule itself. Other exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on some peculiar reliability of the evidence involved. People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 785, 306 P.2d 480, (1957). The exception created by Merkouris was not based on any evidence of the reliability of the declarations, it was based on a rationale that destroys the very foundation of the hearsay rule.

§ 1251. Statement of declarant's previously existing physical or mental condition.

Comment. Section 1250 forbids the use of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. Section 1251, however, permits a statement of memory or belief of a past mental state to be used to prove the previous mental state when the previous mental state is itself in issue in the case. If the past mental state is to be used merely as circumstantial evidence of some other fact, the limitation in Section 1250 still applies and the statement of the past mental state is inadmissible hearsay.

Section 1251 is generally consistent with the California case law, which also permits a statement of a prior mental state to be used as evidence of that

mental state. See, e.g., People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Conv. Coupe, 45 Cal.2d 613, 290 P.2d 538 (1955) (statement of prior knowledge admitted to prove such knowledge). However, Section 1251 requires that the declarant be unavailable as a witness. No similar condition on admissibility has been imposed by the cases. Note, too, that no similar condition appears in Section 1250.

A statement is not admissible under Section 1251 if the statement was made under such circumstances that the declarant in making such statement had motive or reason to deviate from the truth. See Section 1253 and the Comment thereto.

§ 1252. Statement of previous symptoms.

Comment. Under existing California law, a statement of previous symptoms made to a physician for purposes of treatment is considered inadmissible hearsay; although the physician may relate the statement as a matter upon which he based his diagnosis of the declarant's ailment. See discussion in People v. Brown, 49 Cal.2d 577, 585-587, 320 P.2d 5, (1958).

Section 1252 permits statements of previous symptoms made to a physician for purposes of treatment to be used to prove the facts related in the statements. If there is no motive to falsify such statements, they are likely to be highly reliable, for the declarant in making them has based his actions on his belief in their truth--he has consulted the physician and has permitted the physician to use them as a basis for prescribing treatment. Statements made to a physician where there is a motive to manufacture evidence or any other motive to deceive are inadmissible under this section because of the limitation in Section 1253.

§ 1251
§ 1252

§ 1253. Limitation on admissibility of statements of mental or physical state.

Comment. Section 1253 limits the admissibility of hearsay statements that would otherwise be admissible under Sections 1250, 1251, and 1252. If a statement of mental or physical state was made with a motive to misrepresent or to manufacture evidence, the statement is not sufficiently reliable to warrant its reception in evidence. The limitation expressed in Section 1253 has been held to be a condition of admissibility in some of the California cases. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal.2d 881, 893, 895, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649, , , 362 P.2d 473, , (1961); People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177, 187, 148 P.2d 627, (1944).

The Hamilton case mentions some further limitations on the admissibility of statements of mental state. These are not given express recognition in the Evidence Code. However, under Section 352, the judge may in a particular case exclude such evidence if he determines that its prejudicial effect will substantially outweigh its probative value. The specific limitations mentioned in the Hamilton case have not been codified because they are difficult to understand in the light of conflicting and inconsistent language in the case and because in a different case, prosecuted without the excessive prejudice present in the Hamilton case, a court might be warranted in receiving evidence of the kind involved there where its probative value is great.

For example, the opinion states that statements of a homicide victim that are offered to prove his state of mind are inadmissible if they refer solely to alleged past conduct on the part of the accused. 55 Cal.2d at 893-894, 13 Cal. Rptr. at , 362 P.2d at . But the case also states, nonetheless, that statements of "threats . . . on the part of the accused" are admissible on the

issue. 55 Cal.2d at 893, 13 Cal. Rptr. at , 362 P.2d at . The opinion also states that the statements, to be admissible, must refer primarily to the state of mind of the declarant and not the state of mind of the accused. 55 Cal.2d at 893, 13 Cal. Rptr. at , 362 P.2d at . But the case also indicates that narrations of threats made by the accused--statements of his intent--are admissible, but statements of conduct by the accused having no relation to his intent or mental state are not admissible. 55 Cal.2d at 893, 895-896, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 362 P.2d at .

Much of the evidence involved in the Hamilton case is not classified as hearsay under the Evidence Code. It is classified as circumstantial evidence. Hence, the problem presented there is not essentially a hearsay problem. It is a problem of the judge's discretion to exclude highly prejudicial evidence when its probative value is not great. Section 352 of the Evidence Code continues the judge's power to curb the use of such evidence. But the Evidence Code does not freeze the courts to the arbitrary and contradictory standards mentioned in the Hamilton case for determining when prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

Article 6. Statements Relating to Wills and to Claims Against Estates

§ 1260. Statement concerning declarant's will.

Comment. Section 1260 codifies an exception recognized in California case law. Estate of Morrison, 198 Cal. 1, 242 Pac. 939 (1926); Estate of Tompson, 44 Cal. App.2d 774, 112 P.2d 937 (1941). The section is, of course, subject to the provisions of Probate Code Sections 350 and 351 which relate to the establishment of a lost or destroyed will.

The limitation in subdivision (b) is not mentioned in the few decisions involving this exception. The limitation is desirable, however, to assure the reliability of the hearsay admissible under this section.

§ 1261. Statement of decedent offered in action against his estate.

Comment. The Dead Man Statute (subdivision 3 of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1880) prohibits a party suing on a claim against a decedent's estate from testifying to any fact occuring prior to the decedent's death. The theory apparently underlying the statute is that it would be unfair to permit the surviving claimant to testify to such facts when the decedent is precluded from doing so by his death. Because the dead cannot speak, the living may not.

The Dead Man Statute operates unsatisfactorily. It prohibits testimony concerning matters of which the decedent had no knowledge. It does not prohibit testimony relating to claims under, as distinguished from against, the decedent's estate even though the effect of such a claim may be to frustrate the decedent's plan for the disposition of his property. See the Comment to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1880 and Recommendation and Study Relating to the Dead Man Statute, 1 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at D-1 (1957). Hence, the Dead Man Statute is not continued in the Evidence Code.

To equalize the positions of the parties, the Dead Man Statute excludes otherwise relevant and competent evidence--even if it is the only available evidence. This forces the courts to decide cases with a minimum of information concerning the actual facts. See the Supreme Court's complaint in Light v. Stevens, 159 Cal. 288, 292, 113 Pac. 659, 660 (1911): "Owing to the fact that the lips of one of the parties to the transaction are closed by death and those of the other party by the law, the evidence on this question is somewhat unsatisfactory."

Section 1261 balances the positions of the parties in the opposite manner. It is based on the belief that the problem at which the Dead Man Statute is directed is better solved by throwing more light, not less, on the actual facts. Instead of excluding the competent evidence of the claimant, Section 1261 permits the hearsay statements of the decedent to be admitted, provided that they would have been admissible had the decedent made the statements as a witness at the hearing. Certain additional safeguards--recent perception, absence of motive to falsify--are included in the section to provide some protection for the party against whom the statements are offered, for he has no opportunity to test the hearsay by cross-examination.

Article 8. Business Records

§ 1270. "A business."

Comment. This article restates and supersedes the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act appearing in Sections 1953e-1953h of the Code of Civil Procedure. The definition of "a business" in Section 1270 is substantially the same as that appearing in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1953e. A reference to "governmental activity" has been added to the Evidence Code definition to make it clear that records maintained by any governmental agency are admissible if the foundational requirements are met. This does not change existing California law, for the Uniform Act has been construed to be applicable to governmental records. See, e.g., Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal.2d 447, 240 P.2d 569 (1952); Fox v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 11 Cal. App.2d 885, 245 P.2d 603 (1952).

The definition is sufficiently broad to encompass institutions not customarily thought of as businesses. For example, the baptismal and wedding records of a church would be admissible under the section to prove the events recorded. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 371 (3d ed. 1940). Cf. EVIDENCE CODE § 1315.

§ 1271. Business record.

Comment. Section 1271 is the business records exception to the hearsay rule. It is stated in language taken from the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act which was adopted in California in 1941 (Sections 1953e-1953h of the Code of Civil Procedure). Section 1271 does not, however, include the language of Section 1953f.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure because that section is not contained in the Uniform Act and inadequately attempts to make explicit the liberal case-law rule that the Uniform Act permits admission of records kept under any kind of bookkeeping system, whether original or copies, and whether in book, card, looseleaf or some other form. The case-law rule is satisfactory and Section 1953f.5 may have the unintended effect of limiting the provisions of the Uniform Act. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 516 (1963).

§ 1272. Absence of entry in business records.

Comment. Technically, evidence of the absence of a record may not be hearsay. Section 1272 removes any doubt that there might be, however, concerning the admissibility of such evidence under the hearsay rule. It codifies existing case law. People v. Torres, 201 Cal. App.2d 290, 20 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1962).

Article 8. Official Reports and Other Official Writings

§ 1280. Report of public employee.

Comment. Section 1280 restates in substance and supersedes Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1920 and 1926.

The evidence that is admissible under this section is also admissible under Section 1271, the business records exception. However, Section 1271 requires a witness to testify as to the identity of the record and its mode of preparation in every instance. Under Section 1280, as under existing law, the court may admit an official record or report without necessarily requiring a witness to testify as to its identity and mode of preparation if the court has judicial notice or if sufficient independent evidence shows that the record or report was prepared in such a manner as to assure its trustworthiness. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 64 Cal. 87, 27 Pac. 939 (1883) (census report admitted, the court noting the statutes prescribing the method of preparing the report); Vallejo etc. R.R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 571, 147 Pac. 238, 250 (1915) (statistical report of state agency admitted, the court noting the statutory duty to prepare the report).

§ 1281. Report of vital statistic.

Comment. Section 1281 provides a hearsay exception for official reports concerning birth, death, and marriage. Reports of such events occurring within California are now admissible under the provisions of Section 10577 of the Health and Safety Code. Section 1281 provides a broader exception which includes similar reports from other jurisdictions.

§ 1282. Finding of presumed death by authorized federal employee.

Comment. Section 1282 restates and supersedes the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1928.1. The evidence admissible under Section 1282 is limited to evidence of the fact of death and of the date, circumstances, and place of disappearance.

The determination of the date of the presumed death by the federal employee is a determination ordinarily made for the purpose of determining whether the pay of a missing person should be stopped and his name stricken from the payroll. The date so determined should not be given any consideration in the California courts since the issues involved in the California proceedings require determination of the date of death for a different purpose. Hence Section 1282 does not make admissible the finding of the date of presumed death. On the other hand, the determination of the date, circumstances, and place of disappearance is reliable information that will assist the trier of fact in determining the date when the person died and is admissible under this section. Often the date of death may be inferred from the circumstances of the disappearance. See, In re Thornburg's Estate, 186 Or. 570, 208 P.2nd 349 (1949); Lukens v. Camden Trust Co., 2 N.J. Super. 214, 62 A.2nd 886 (1948).

Section 1282 provides a convenient and reliable method of proof of death of persons covered by the Federal Missing Persons Act. See, e.g., In re Jacobsen's Estate, 208 Misc. 443, 143 N.Y.S.2nd 432 (1955)(proof of death of 2-year old dependent of serviceman where child was passenger on plane lost at sea).

§ 1283. Report by federal employee that person is missing, captured, or the like.

Comment. Section 1283 restates and supersedes the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1928.2. The language of Section 1928.2 has been revised to reflect the 1953 amendments to the Federal Missing Persons Act.

§ 1284. Statement of absence of public record.

Comment. Just as the existence and content of a public record may be proved under Section 1510 by a copy accompanied by the attestation or certificate of the custodian reciting that it is a copy, the absence of such a record from a particular public office may be proved under Section 1284 by a writing made by the custodian of the records in that office stating that no such record was found after a diligent search. The writing must, of course, be properly authenticated. See Sections 1401, 1451. The exception is justified by the likelihood that such statement made by the custodian of the records is accurate and by the necessity for providing a simple and inexpensive method of proving the absence of a public record.

Article 9. Former Testimony

§ 1290. "Former testimony."

Comment. The purpose of Section 1290 is to provide a convenient term for use in the substantive provisions in the remainder of this article. It should be noted that depositions taken in another action are considered former testimony under Section 1290, and their admissibility is determined by Sections 1291 and 1292.

The use of a deposition taken in the same action, however, is not covered by this article. Code of Civil Procedure Sections 2016-2035 deal comprehensively with the conditions and circumstances under which a deposition taken in a civil action may be used at the trial of the action in which the deposition was taken, and Penal Code Sections 1345 and 1362 prescribe the conditions for admitting the deposition of a witness that has been taken in the same criminal action. These sections will continue to govern the use of depositions in the action in which they are taken.

§ 1291. Former testimony offered against party to former proceeding.

Comment. Section 1291 provides a hearsay exception for former testimony offered against a person who was a party to the proceeding in which the former testimony was given. For example, if a series of cases arise involving several plaintiffs and but one defendant, Section 1291 permits testimony given in the first trial to be used against the defendant in a later trial if the conditions of admissibility stated in the section are met.

Former testimony is admissible under Section 1291 only if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.

Paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1291 provides for the admission of former testimony if it is offered against the party who offered it in the previous proceeding. This evidence, in effect, is somewhat analogous to an admission. If the party finds that the evidence he originally offered in his favor now works to his disadvantage, he can respond as any party does to an admission. Moreover, since the witness is no longer available to testify, the party's previous direct and redirect examination should be considered an adequate substitute for his present right to cross-examine.

Paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1291 provides for the admissibility of former testimony where the party against whom it is now offered had the right and opportunity in the former proceeding to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he now has. Since the party has had his opportunity to cross-examine, the primary objection to hearsay evidence--lack of opportunity to cross-examine the declarant--is not applicable. On the other hand, paragraph (2) does not make the former testimony admissible where the party against whom it is offered did not have a similar motive and interest to cross-examine. In determining the similarity of interest and motive to cross-examine, the judge should be guided by practical considerations and not merely by the similarity of the party's position in the two cases. For example, testimony contained in a deposition that was taken, but not offered in evidence at the trial, in a different action should be excluded if the judge determines that the deposition was taken for discovery purposes and that the party did not subject the witness to a thorough cross-examination because he sought to avoid a premature revelation of the weakness in the testimony of the witness or in the adverse party's case. In such a situation, the party's interest and motive for cross-examination on the previous occasion would have been substantially different from his present interest and motive.

Under paragraph (2), testimony in a deposition taken in another action and testimony given in a preliminary examination in another criminal action is not admissible against the defendant in a criminal case unless it was received in evidence at the trial of such other action. This limitation insures that the person accused of crime will have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.

Section 1291 supersedes Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870(8) which permits former testimony to be admitted in a civil case only if the former proceeding was an action between the same parties or their predecessors in interest, relating to the same matter, or was a former trial of the action in which the testimony is offered. Section 1291 will also permit a broader range of hearsay to be introduced against the defendant in a criminal action than has been permitted under Penal Code Section 686. Under that section, former testimony has been admissible against the defendant in a criminal action only if the former testimony was given in the same action--at the preliminary examination, in a deposition, or in a prior trial of the action.

Subdivision (b) of Section 1291 makes it clear that objections based on the competence of the declarant or on privilege are to be determined by reference to the time the former testimony was given. Existing California law is not clear on this point; some California decisions indicate that competency and privilege are to be determined as of the time the former testimony was given, but others indicate that competency and privilege are to be determined as of the time the former testimony is offered in evidence. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 581-585 (1963).

Subdivision (b) also provides that objections to the form of the question may not be used to exclude the former testimony. Where the former testimony is offered under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the party against whom the former testimony is now offered himself phrased the question; and where the former testimony comes in under paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), the party against whom the testimony is now offered had the opportunity to object to the form of the question when it was asked on the former occasion. Hence, the

party is not permitted to raise this technical objection when the former testimony is offered against him.

§ 1292. Former testimony offered against person not a party to former proceeding.

Comment. Section 1292 provides a hearsay exception for former testimony given at the former proceeding by a person who is now unavailable as a witness when such former testimony is offered against a person who was not a party to the former proceeding but whose motive for cross-examination is similar to that of a person who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant when the former testimony was given. For example, if a series of cases arise involving one occurence and one defendant but several plaintiffs, Section 1292 permits testimony given against the plaintiff in the first trial to be used against a plaintiff in a later trial if the conditions of admissibility stated in the section are met.

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870(8) (which is superseded by this article), does not permit admission of the former testimony made admissible by Section 1292. The out-dated "identity of parties" and "identity of issues" requirements of Section 1870 are too restrictive, and Section 1292 substitutes what is, in effect, a more flexible "trustworthiness" approach characteristic of other hearsay exceptions. The trustworthiness of the former testimony is sufficiently guaranteed because the former adverse party had the right and opportunity to cross-examine with an interest and motive similar to that of the present adverse party. Although the party against whom the former testimony is offered did not himself have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the former occasion, it can be generally assumed that most prior cross-examination is

adequate, especially if the same stakes are involved. If the same stakes are not involved, the difference in interest or motivation would justify exclusion. And, even where if the prior cross-examination was inadequate, there is better reason here for providing a hearsay exception than there is for many of the presently recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. As Professor McCormick states:

> . . . I suggest that if the witness is unavailable, then the need for the sworn, transcribed former testimony in the ascertainment of truth is so great, and its reliability so far superior to most, if not all the other types of oral hearsay coming in under the other exceptions, that the requirements of identity of parties and issues be dispensed with. This dispenses with the opportunity for cross-examination, that great characteristic weapon of our adversary system. But the other types of admissible oral hearsay, admissions, declarations against interest, statements about bodily symptoms, likewise dispense with cross-examination, for declarations having far less trustworthiness than the sworn testimony in open court, and with a far greater hazard of fabrication or mistake in the reporting of the declaration by the witness. [McCormick, Evidence § 238, p. 501 (1954).]

Section 1292 does not make former testimony admissible against the defendant in a criminal case. This limitation preserves the right of a person accused of crime to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. When a person's life or liberty is at stake--as it is in a criminal trial--the accused should not be compelled to rely on the fact that another person has had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

Subdivision (b) of Section 1292 makes it clear that objections based on competency or privilege are to be determined by reference to the time when the former testimony was given. Existing California law is not clear on this point; some California decisions indicate that competency and privilege are to be determined as of the time the former testimony was given but others indicate that competency and privilege are to be determined as of the time

the former testimony is offered in evidence. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 581-585 (1963).

Article 10. Judgments

§ 1300. Judgment of felony conviction.

Comment. Analytically, a judgment that is offered to prove the matters determined by the judgment is hearsay evidence. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 63(20), Comment (1953); Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII. Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 539-541 (1963). It is in substance a statement of the court that determined the previous action ("a statement made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing") that is offered "to prove the truth of the matter stated." Section 155. Therefore, unless there is an exception to the hearsay rule provided, a judgment is inadmissible if offered in a subsequent action to prove the matters determined. This article provides hearsay exceptions for certain kinds of judgments, and thus permits them to be used in subsequent actions as evidence despite the restrictions of the hearsay rule.

Of course, a judgment may, as a matter of substantive law, conclusively establish certain facts insofar as a party is concerned. Teitlebaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). The sections of this article do not purport to deal with the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. These sections deal only with the evidentiary use of

judgments in those cases where the substantive law does not require that the judgments be given conclusive effect.

Section 1300 provides an exception to the hearsay rule for a final judgment adjudging a person guilty of a felony. The exception does not, however, apply in criminal actions. Hence, if a plaintiff sues to recover a reward offered by the defendant for the arrest and conviction of a person who committed a particular crime, Section 1300 permits the plaintiff to use a judgment of felony conviction as evidence that the person convicted committed the crime. But, Section 1300 does not permit the judgment to be used in a criminal action as evidence of the identity of the person who committed the crime or as evidence that the crime was committed.

Section 1300 will change the California law. Under existing California law, a conviction of a crime is inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent action. Marceau v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 101 Cal. 338, 35 Pac. 856 (1894) (evidence of murder conviction inadmissible to prove insured was intentionally killed); Burke v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 34 Cal. 60 (1867) (evidence of robbery conviction inadmissible to prove identity of robber in action to recover reward). The change, however, is desirable; for the evidence involved is peculiarly reliable. The seriousness of the charge assures that the facts will be thoroughly litigated, and the fact that the judgment must be based upon a unanimous determination that there was not a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt assures that the question of guilt will be thoroughly considered.

The exception in Section 1300 for cases where the judgment is based on a plea of nolo contendere is a reflection of the policy expressed in Penal Code Section 1016.

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§ 1301. Judgment against person entitled to indemnity.

Comment. If a person entitled to indemnity, or if the obligee under a warranty contract, complies with certain conditions relating to notice and defense, the indemnitor or warrantor is conclusively bound by any judgment recovered. CIVIL CODE § 2778(5); CODE CIV. PROC. § 1912; McCormick v. Marcy, 165 Cal. 386, 132 Pac. 449 (1913).

Where judgment against an indemnitee or person protected by a warranty is not made conclusive on the indemnitor or warrantor, Section 1301 permits the judgment to be used as hearsay evidence in an action to recover on the indemnity or warranty. Section 1301 reflects the existing law relating to indemnity agreements. CIVIL CODE § 2778, subdivision 6. Section 1301 probably restates the law relating to warranties, too, but the law in that regard is not altogether clear. Erie City Iron Works v. Tatum, 1 Cal. App. 286, 82 Pac. 92 (1905). But see Peabody v. Phelps, 9 Cal. 213 (1858).

§ 1302. Judgment determining liability of third person.

Comment. Section 1302 expresses an exception contained in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1851. Ellsworth v. Bradford, 186 Cal. 316, 199 Pac. 335 (1921); Nordin v. Bank of America, 11 Cal. App.2d 98, 52 P.2d 1018 (1936). Together, Evidence Code Sections 1302 and 1226 restate and supersede the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1851.

Article 11. Family History

§ 1310. Statement concerning declarant's own family history.

Comment. Section 1310 provides a hearsay exception for a statement concerning the declarant's own family history. It restates in substance and

supersedes Section 1870(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 1870(4), however, requires that the declarant be dead whereas unavailability of the declarant for any of the reasons specified in Section 240 makes the statement admissible under Section 1310.

The statement is not admissible if it was made under such circumstances that the declarant in making the statement had motive or reason to deviate from the truth. This permits the judge to exclude the statement where it was made under such circumstances as to case doubt upon its trustworthiness. The requirement is basically the same as the requirement of existing case law that the statement be made at a time when no controversy existed on the precise point concerning which the declaration was made. See, e.g., Estate of Walder, 166 Cal. 446, 137 Pac. 35 (1913); Estate of Nidever, 181 Cal. App.2d 367, 5 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1960).

§ 1311. Statement concerning family history of another.

Comment. Section 1311 provides a hearsay exception for a statement concerning the family history of another. Paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) restates in substance existing California law as found in Section 1870(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which it supersedes. Paragraph (2) is new to California law, but it is a sound extension of the present law to cover a situation where the declarant was a family housekeeper or doctor or so close a friend as to be included by the family in discussions of its family history.

There are two limitations on admissibility of a statement under Section 1311. First, a statement is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable as a witness within the meaning of Section 240. (Section 1870(4) requires that

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the declarant be deceased in order for his statement to be admissible.) Second, a statement is not admissible if it was made under such circumstances that the declarant in making the statement had motive or reason to deviate from the truth. For a discussion of this requirement, see comment to Section 1310.

§ 1312. Entries in family bibles and the like.

Comment. Section 1312 restates in substance and supersedes the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870(13).

§ 1313. Reputation in family concerning family history.

Comment. Section 1313 restates in substance and supersedes the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1852 and 1870(11). See Estate of Connors, 53 Cal. App.2d 484, 128 P.2d 200 (1942); Estate of Newman, 34 Cal. App.2d 706, 94 P.2d 356 (1939). However, Section 1870(11) requires that the family reputation in question have existed "previous to the controversy." This qualification is not included in Section 1313 because it is unlikely that a family reputation on a matter of pedigree would be influenced by the existence of a controversy even though the declaration of an individual member of the family, covered in Sections 1300 and 1311, might be.

The family tradition admitted under Section 1313 is necessarily multiple hearsay. If, however, such tradition were inadmissible because of the hearsay rule, and if direct statements of pedigree were inadmissible because they are based on such traditions (as most of them are), the courts would be virtually helpless in determining matters of pedigree. See Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article VIII.

Hearsay Evidence), 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES at 548 (1963).

§ 1314. Community reputation concerning family history.

Comment. Section 1314 restates what has been held to be existing law under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1963(30) with respect to proof of the fact of marriage. See Estate of Baldwin, 162 Cal. 471, 123 Pac. 267 (1912); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956). However, Section 1314 has no counterpart in California law insofar as proof of the date or fact of birth, divorce, or death is concerned, proof of such facts by reputation now being limited to reputation in the family. See Estate of Heaton, 135 Cal. 385, 67 Pac. 321 (1902).

§ 1315. Church records concerning family history.

Comment. Church records generally are admissible as business records under the provisions of Section 1271. Under Section 1271, such records would be admissible to prove the occurence of the church activity--the baptism, confirmation, or marriage--recorded in the writing. However, it is unlikely that Section 1271 would permit such records to be used as evidence of the age or relationship of the participants; for the business records act has been held to authorize business records to be used to prove only facts known personally to the recorder of the information or to other employees of the business. Patek & Co. v. Vineberg, 210 Cal. App.2d 20, 23, 26 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1962) (hearing denied); People v. Williams, 187 Cal. App.2d 355, 9 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1960); Gough v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 162 Cal. App.2d 90, 327 P.2d 555 (1958).

Section 1315 permits church records to be used to prove certain additional information. Facts of family history such as birth dates, relationships,

marital records, etc., that are ordinarily reported to church authorities and recorded in connection with the church's baptismal, confirmation, marriage, and funeral records may be proved by such records under Section 1315.

Section 1315 continues in effect and supersedes the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1919a without, however, the special and cumbersome authentication procedure specified in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1919b. Under Section 1315, church records must be authenticated in the same manner that other business records are authenticated.

§ 1316. Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates.

Comment. Section 1316 provides a hearsay exception for marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. This exception is somewhat broader than that found in Sections 1919a and 1919b of the Code of Civil Procedure (superseded by Sections 1315 and 1316). Sections 1919a and 1919b are limited to church records and hence, as respects marriages, to those performed by clergymen. Moreover, they establish an elaborate and detailed authentication procedure whereas certificates made admissible by Section 1316 need only meet the general authentication requirement of Section 1401.

Article 12. Reputation and Statements Concerning Community History, Property Interest, and Character.

§ 1320. Reputation concerning community history.

Comment. Section 1320 provides a wider rule of admissibility than does Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870(11), which it supersedes in part. Section 1870 provides in relevant part that proof may be made of "common reputation

existing previously to the controversy, respecting facts of a public or general nature more than thirty years old." The 30-year limitation is essentially arbitrary. The important question would seem to be whether a community reputation on the matter involved exists; its age would appear to go more to its venerability than to its truth. Nor is it necessary to include in Section 1320 the requirement that the reputation existed previous to controversy. It is unlikely that a community reputation respecting an event of general history would be influenced by the existence of a controversy.

§ 1321. Reputation concerning public interest in property.

Comment. Section 1321 preserves the rule in Simons v. Inyo Cerro Gordo Co., 48 Cal. App. 524, 192 Pac. 144 (1920). It does not require, however, that the reputation be more than 30 years old, but merely that the reputation arose before controversy. See Comment to Section 1320.

§ 1322. Reputation concerning boundary or custom affecting land.

Comment. Section 1322 restates in substance existing law as found in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1870(11), which it supersedes in part. See Muller v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Cal. 240, 23 Pac. 265 (1890); Ferris v. Emmons, 214 Cal. 501, 6 P.2d 950 (1931).

§ 1323. Statement concerning boundary.

Comment. Section 1323 restates the substance of existing but uncodified California law found in such cases as Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 275 (1860) and Morcom v. Baiersky, 16 Cal. App. 480, 117 Pac. 560 (1911).

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§ 1324. Reputation concerning character.

Comment. Section 1324 codifies a well-settled exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., People v. Cobb, 45 Cal.2d 158, 287 P.2d 752 (1955). Of course, character evidence is admissible only when the question of character is material to the matter being litigated. The only purpose of Section 1324 is to declare that reputation evidence as to character or a trait of character is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule.

Article 13. Dispositive Instruments and Ancient Writings

§ 1330. Recitals in writings affecting property.

Comment. Section 1330 restates in substance the existing California law relating to recitals in dispositive instruments. Although language in some cases appears to require that the dispositive instrument be ancient, cases may be found in which recitals in dispositive instruments have been admitted without regard to the age of the instrument. Russell v. Langford, 135 Cal. 356, 67 Pac. 331 (1902) (recital in will); Pearson v. Pearson, 46 Cal. 609 (1873) (recital in will); Culver v. Newhart, 18 Cal. App. 614, 123 Pac. 975 (1912) (bill of sale). There is a sufficient likelihood that the statements made in a dispositive document, when related to the purpose of the document, will be true to warrant the admissibility of such documents without regard to their age.

§ 1331. Recitals in ancient writings.

Comment. Section 1331 clarifies the existing California law relating to the admissibility of recitals in ancient documents by providing that such recitals are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Code of Civil

Procedure Section 1963(34) (superseded by Evidence Code) provides that a document more than 30 years old is presumed genuine if it has been generally acted upon as genuine by persons having an interest in the matter. The Supreme Court has held that a document meeting this section's requirements is presumed to be genuine--presumed to be what it purports to be--but that the genuineness of the document imports no verity to the recitals contained therein. Gwin v. Calegaris, 139 Cal. 384, 389, 73 Pac. 851, 853 (1903). Recent cases decided by district courts of appeal, however, have held that the recitals in such a document are admissible to prove the truth of the facts recited. E.g., Estate of Nidever, 181 Cal. App.2d 367, 5 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1960); Kirkpatrick v. Tapo Oil Co., 144 Cal. App.2d 404, 301 P.2d 274 (1956). And in some of these cases the courts have not insisted that the hearsay statement itself be acted upon as true by persons with an interest in the matter; the evidence has been admitted upon a showing that the document containing the statement is genuine. The age of a document alone is not a sufficient guarantee of the trustworthiness of a statement contained therein to warrant the admission of the statement into evidence. Accordingly, Section 1331 makes clear that the hearsay statement itself must have been generally acted upon as true for at least a generation by persons having an interest in the matter.

Article 14. Commercial, Scientific, and Similar Publications

§ 1340. Commercial lists and the like.

Comment. Section 1340 codifies an exception that has been recognized by statute and by the courts in specific situations. See, e.g., COM. CODE § 2724; Emery v. So. Cal. Gas Co., 72 Cal. App.2d 821, 165 P.2d 695 (1946);

Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal. App.2d 332, 112 P.2d 723 (1941).

§ 1341. Publications concerning facts of general notoriety and interest.

Comment. Section 1341 recodifies without substantive change Section 1936 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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